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PRIVACY RIGHTS IN MEDICAL RECORDS
I. Introduction
Medical records often contain intimate personal information.' If
disclosed to others, this information could cause embarrassment and
humiliation, lead to loss of employment, educational, financial and
social opportunities and infringe on legal rights. Disclosure of medical
information could also damage family relationships, reputation and
self-esteem. 2 Public concern with confidentiality of medical infor-
mation is not new,3 but since legal protections of personal information
are relatively new, 4 the privacy interest recognized in medical records
1. In addition to such non-sensitive information as name and address, medical
records may contain personal details including age, life history, family background,
medical history, present and past health or illness, mental and emotional health
or illness, treatment, accident reports, laboratory reports and other scientific data
from various sources. The record may also contain medical providers' notes and
hunches, prognoses, and reports of the patient's response to treatment. See generally
E. HAYT, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF HOSPITAL RECORDS 39 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as HAYT].
2. Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act: Hearing on H.R. 5935 Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means', 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5935] (statement of Marcia K. Goin,
M.D., Chairperson, Comm. on Confidentiality, Am. Psy~hiatric Ass'n); see also
H. SCHUCHMAN, CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS, 1-7 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as SCHUCHMAN] (healing and helping relationships require confidentiality which
compels that any disclosure of health information be carefully controlled; otherwise,
"we place an unconscionable barrier before those needing assistance and treatment").
3. Confidentiality of medical information has been a part of medical practice
since it began. Respect for patient privacy is reflected in the Hippocratic Oath and
the American Medical Association's Principles of Ethics. Confidentiality of Medical
Records: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Confidentiality of Medical
Records] (views of Rep. David E. Satterfield III).
The Hippocratic Oath states in part: "Whatever, in connection with my profession,
or not in connection with it, I may see or hear in the lives of men which ought
not to be spoken abroad I will not divulge as reckoning that all should be kept
secret." The Hippocratic Oath, quoted in Britton, Rights to Privacy in Medical
Records, J. LEGAL MED. 30, 30 (July/August 1975) [hereinafter cited as Britton].
The conflict between privacy interests and society's legitimate needs for infor-
mation is apparent in section 9 of the 1957 Principles of Medical Ethics of the
American Medical Association, which states:
A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course
of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character
of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes




Until Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974, finding the right to
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is in its infancy.5 Developments in medicine6 have reduced dependence
on the family doctor's discretion to protect the patient's personal
information. 7 Vast changes in medical technology, the advent of
third-party payment, 8 government participation in medical care, 9 and
computerization of record-keeping systems 10 have expanded the
privacy a fundamental constitutional right and empowering the Privacy
Protection Study Commission to thoroughly review the significant and
complex issues in this field, less attention had been paid by public and
private policymakers to the universe of privacy issues than to any of
the other major "rights" possessed by Americans.
H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 11 (statement of Larry S. Gage, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Legislation (Health), HEW).
Legal privacy protections are constitutional, common law and statutory. They
are discussed in detail infra in sections II.A, B and C respectively. Non-legal privacy
protections include "physical barriers, distance and technological limitations," cost,
moral respect for privacy, disapproval and resentment of intrusion, and professional
ethics (e.g., doctors, lawyers and ministers). K. GREENAWALT, LEGAL PROTECTIONS
OF PRIVACY, FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Ex-
ECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 13-14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GREENAWALT].
Presently, there is no method for accurately determining a person's inner thoughts
and emotions, other than by force or drugs; the lie detector and "body language"
are not dependable, and inferences about a person from the books he reads, his
type of friends and choice of activities are not easy to ascertain or interpret. Id.
at 13. Furthermore, since enacting laws "inevitably involves restriction of someone's
liberty and costs of enforcement, it is not always a method to be indulged even
when it could improve a social situation in some respect." Id. at 14.
5. See SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 6.
6. For a brief history of the development of medical record-keeping practices,
see HAYT, supra note 1, at 39-40.
7. H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 78 (statement of Frederick Ackerman, M.D.,
Chairman, Counsel on Legislation, American Medical Ass'n).
8. Third party payment includes payment by government, insurance and em-
ployer. By 1982, insurance companies or government agencies had paid for medical
and hospital bills of two hundred million Americans. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2,
at 4. An example of government payment for health care is Medicaid. This program
provides aid for medical payments of low-income individuals. The program is state-
administered and federally reimbursed. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 81. Insurance,
on the other hand, is a contracted-for promise, made in exchange for consideration,
to pay the insured if a loss of a certain specified type ensues. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 721 (5th ed. 1979).
9. H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 78. In addition to medical payment programs
such as Medicaid, the government participates in medical care through grant pro-
grains. For example, through the Department of Health and Human Services, funds
are distributed to Health Maintenance Organizations, and Alcohol and Drug Abuse,
Mental Health and Preventive Health programs. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 88-
89.
10. Computerized medical information has caused much concern because of the
ease with which it may be retrieved and shared.
Public concern over the protection of personal privacy has risen almost
exponentially with the growth of our ability to store and rapidly transmit
vast amounts of data. Not too many years ago, personal privacy was
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amount, type and accessibility of health data available about an
individual." These factors have also increased the frequency of
requests for medical records by individuals, private institutions and
government bodies.' 2 Health records may be sought for a variety
of purposes: law enforcement, 3 civil and criminal legal actions,
4
public health evaluation including epidemiological" and occupational
protected rather nicely by the cost and practical difficulties associated
with storing and handling paper records. Modern data processing advances
have changed all of that. Computers and telecommunications technology
combined have caused a virtual explosion in the ability of people to
manage information. As it has become easier to deal with information,
more and more people have found new ways to use records that were
once too cumbersome to store, handle and utilize.
H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Hon. Thomas N. Kindness).
11. See generally Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy:
The Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975) (discussing com-
puterization in following areas: clinical medicine; statistical research and policy
planning; and payment for medical treatment).
12. Another issue to consider is the patient's access to information contained
in his own medical records. Traditionally, consumer access to health records was
rarely possible. Recently, however, legislative, administrative and judicial attention
has focused on this injustice, resulting in the recognition of this right by most
American jurisdictions. See SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 32-34. An example is a
New York law, where unprofessional conduct for certain specified health-related
professionals includes failure
upon a patient's written request . . . to make available to a patient,
or, to another licensed health practitioner consistent with that practi-
tioner's authorized scope of practice, copies of the record ...and copies
of reports, test records, evaluations or X-rays . . . [unless] in the
reasonable exercise of [the practitioner's] professional judgment . . .
release of such information would adversely affect the patient's health.
8 NYCRR 29.2(a)(6) (1977). On the federal level, the Privacy Act of 1974 includes
medical records in its access provision: "Each [federal] agency that maintains a
system of records shall-upon request by any individual to gain access to his record
or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit
him ...to review the record and have a copy made .... ." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1)
(1982). The underlying philosophy of such legislation is that the patient is the
"person most concerned" with his medical record. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at
33. The patient, then, should control the use of and access to that record. Id. In
some cases, where access would be harmful to the patient, he should not have
such control over his record.
13. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of law-
enforcement purposes.
14. For example, medical records may be required in the following legal actions:
third party claims for payment of health, accident and life insurance, claims for
wrongful death, personal injury, medical malpractice, and probate, products liability
and contract claims, and criminal cases. Britton, supra note 3, at 30.
15. Epidemiology is described as:
[T]he study of the distribution of disease and the dynamics of disease
in the human population, [the purpose of which] is to identify specific
agents or factors related to people and their environment that may either
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health research,16 third-party payment, 7 employment,s credit-rating, 19
and for use by other health care providers. 20
While granting access may be proper in some circumstances, where
cause disease or may identify people who have a high risk for developing
a disease.
By finding these causes and eliminating the exposure for these causes,
[epidemiologists] can hopefully prevent disease in the population. By
finding people who are at high risk, [epidemiologists] can direct them
to medical care and detect their diseases at an earlier stage ....
[I]n order to carry out these studies . . . individually identifiable
information from medical records is essential. It is necessary so that
[epidemiologists] can find individuals who have a specific disease and
obtain followup information. It is also necessary in order to link records
from hospitals, death certificates, and areas of employment in order to
investigate specific diseases.
[Elpidemiologic investigations, whether they deal with environmental
agents, newly developed medications, the natural history of disease, or
the effectiveness of medical care, are of great potential benefit to society.
Confidentiality of Medical Records, supra note 3, at 51-52 (statement of Dr. Leon
Gordis on behalf of Soc'y of Epidemiologic Research and Ass'n of Am. Medical
Colleges).
16. Occupational health research entails investigations of employment conditions
and employee health to determine if materials used in that environment, in the
concentrations and exposure generally present, negatively affect employee health.
See Occupational Safety and Health Act of. 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 669 (1982). This
Act authorizes the creation of a National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health to carry out this research. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1982). For a discussion of
toxicity in the workplace, see Piller, Toxic Time Bombs in the Factory, 232 NATION
395 (1981). See infra notes 160-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of
occupational health research. For a general discussion of, and background to, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982), see
SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS ACHIEVE-
MENTS (1976).
17. H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 5. Much information pertaining to consumer
health records is derived by insurance companies from the Medical Information
Bureau (MIB). Over 700 life insurance companies are members of this organization.
Your medical records: Not so private anymore, 35 CHANGING TIMES 41, 42 (July
1981) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING TIMES]. It collects medical information of
applicants for insurance policies. This information is given out to other members
on request. So far, information on 11,000,000 people has been collected. Id. at
42. MIB states that the information is shared only if the applicant has "authorized"
it. Id. Most applicants for health insurance automatically sign a blanket consent
form, often unwittingly authorizing such information sharing. Winslade, Confi-
dentiality of Medical Records: An Overview of Concepts and Legal Policies, 3 J.
LEGAL MEDICINE 497, 509 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Winslade]. Another company,
Equifax, investigates applicants for health.and life insurance. It also checks credit
and employment background, and tries to "avoid mingling medical records with
the information creditors might want to examine." CHANGING TIMES, supra, at 42.
18. See HAYT, supra note 1, at 187.
19. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
20. For example, when a general practitioner refers a patient to a specialist,
that specialist will want copies of or access to the medical information (X-rays,
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medical information has been sought for illegitimate purposes such
as curiosity and defamation, access should be denied. 21 Furthermore,
legitimate requests for information may succeed too well. Often the
entire record has been shared where limited disclosure of the specific
facts required would have been appropriate.
22
Although the privacy interest in medical records has been partially
acknowledged, 23 society's legitimate need for the recorded infor-
mation often supersedes that interest. 24 Current legislative25 and
laboratory tests and so on) recorded by the general practitioner. This not only
saves the patient the time, money and perhaps discomfort of going through duplicate
tests, but also may be the only method of properly tracking the progression of
the patient's illness.
21. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. Other potentially illegitimate
uses of medical records are noted in the following statement:
The outward flow of medical data . . . has enormous impact on people's
lives. It affects decisions on whether they are hired or fired; whether
they can secure business licenses and life insurance; whether they are
permitted to drive cars; whether they are placed under police surveillance
or labelled a security risk; or even whether they can get nominated for
and elected to a political office.
Confidentiality of Medical Records, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Senator Robert
Dole, quoting Alan F. Westin).
22. Winslade, supra note 17, at 509-10. This result has been attributed to the
fact that medical records are perceived as belonging to their custodian-the doctor
or hospital-rather than to the patient. Id.
23. An individual's privacy interest in preserving the confidentiality of his medical
records has been recognized by both federal and state privacy laws governing record-
keeping practices of public employers and agencies. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982) (forbidding disclosure of medical records without written
consent, unless covered by specific statutory exception); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §
89(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (requiring agencies to withhold or delete identifying
material in medical records to prevent unwarranted invasions of personal privacy);
see also Final Report of the Privacy Protection Study Comm'n: Joint Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Protection Commission] (recommending criminal
penalties in private sector to end deceptive methods of obtaining medical files).
24. Case law indicates that the privacy interest in medical records carries little
weight and may be supplanted by legitimate societal needs. See Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (New York State prescription reporting law, designed to
combat illegal use of dangerous drugs, did not pose "sufficiently grievous threat"
to patients' privacy interests to require its invalidation); Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) ("[r]ecordkeeping and reporting
requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health
and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible").
25. After publication of the Privacy Protection Study Commission report, au-
thorized by the Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 23, Congress began to study the
issue of privacy in medical records. Since that time, hearings have been held and
several bills have been introduced which specifically would protect medical records.
However, none have been enacted. See H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 1 (Federal
Privacy of Medical Information Act; proposed to protect patient privacy by con-
trolling the use and disclosure of medical information); S.503 & S.865, 96th Cong.,
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judicial 6 debate has focused on the interaction of these conflicting
interests.
This Note examines the current constitutional, common law and
statutory status of privacy rights and exposes pertinent medical
records issues in each area." Invasions of medical records privacy
and corresponding legal responses will also be discussed.28 The Note then
analyzes the critical factors in medical records privacy cases and
correlates the purposes for seeking medical records with the likelihood
that a court will recognize the privacy interest.29 This discussion will
clarify the issues which should be addressed when analyzing medical
records privacy issues in the future.
1I. Overview of Privacy Protections with Respect to Medical
Records
"Privacy" has no single definition; it changes according to its
legal context. The constitutional and common law aspects of privacy
indicate that it is a "right to be let alone"3 0 and to be free from
government intrusion," whereas the statutory definition focuses on
1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S.503 & S.8651 (introduced by former Senator
Javits and the Carter Administration, respectively) (these bills sought to provide
for patient access to their own records, prohibit disclosure without patient consent,
with a few exceptions, and restrict access to medical records by government au-
thorities); H.515, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983 (introduced by Rep. Crane) (died in
committee) (providing for confidentiality of medical and dental records of patients
not receiving assistance from federal government).
26. For example, while the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1976), found that patients' constitutional rights in the privacy of their medical
records were not sufficiently infringed upon by New York's prescription reporting
statute, the Court did not clarify under what circumstances it would find that these
privacy rights had been violated. 429 U.S. at 603-4. Four years later, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated: "There can be no question that an employee's
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well
within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection." United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of case law on constitutional privacy in medical records, see infra
Part 1I.A.
27. See infra notes 31-153 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 154-244 and accompanying text.
30. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated: "The makers of our Constitution ...sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Id.
31. GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at vii.
Protection from governmental intrusion on privacy is predicated on a
19851 PRIVACY RIGHTS
an individual's right to control personal information.12 Constitutional
and certain statutory protections are effective when an individual's
privacy is invaded by the government,33 while common law and other
statutory protections are available against non-governmental intru-
sions. 34
A. Constitutional Privacy Protections3
The right to privacy is not guaranteed by a particular constitutional
regard for individual liberty and political freedom. Classically, the privacy
of a man's property, activity and expression from all but the most limited
and well-controlled interference by government has been believed critical
to political independence. Without protections of privacy, that inde-
pendence would be jeopardized by the inherent coercive power of gov-
ernment.
Id. at viii-ix.
32. Statutory protections generally concern records maintained about individuals
which are collected, retained and used by government agencies. These laws usually
determine to whom, and under what circumstances disclosure will be allowed. See,
e.g., id. at 57 (discussing Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982));
SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 67. The Privacy Act is intended to prohibit unnecessary
collection of information, and to allow individuals to find out what information
has been collected about them by government agencies. Id. It also allows individuals
to delete or correct inaccurate information in these records. Id. Other statutory
protections affect certain records maintained by private entities. For examples see
infra note 99.
33. For a discussion of constitutional protections, see infra notes 37-69 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of statutory protections, see infra notes 95-
153 and accompanying text.
Under certain circumstances, intrusions by private entities may give rise to con-
stitutional privacy protections. This requires government regulation of the entity
and "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
Such interdependence may arise where a private entity exercises traditional gov-
ernmental powers which have been delegated to it. Id. at 352. Government regulation
alone is not state action. Id. at 358.
34. For a discussion of common law and statutory protections, see infra notes
70-153 and accompanying text.
35. While the constitutional protections considered in this Note concern the
United States Constitution, it may be important in some cases to evaluate state
constitutional provisions. Certain state legislatures and courts have been more
responsive to privacy needs than have their federal counterparts. For example,
California amended its state constitution in 1972 to expressly protect the "inalienable
right" to personal privacy. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Resulting case law indicates
that this right extends beyond protections against governmental intrusions (to which
federal constitutional protection is limited) to protect against intrusions by private
entities as well. See generally Linowes, Preface to PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMM'N, PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, APPENDIX 1 TO THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY LAW IN THE
STATES]. For examples of privacy cases arising under the California section, see
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provision.3 6 Although there is no general constitutional "right to
privacy," 37 it is considered to be a fundamental right3" derived from
the constitution by implication.39 Theoretically, a fundamental right
may be regulated by government only when there is a compelling
state interestA0 However, in practice, the lesser standard of important
state interest measures government privacy infringements. 41 Conse-
quently, state public health and law enforcement interests have been
found to supersede privacy rights. 42
1. Historical Discussion
The right to privacy, first recognized by Thomas Cooley in 1888,' 4
had its modern roots in a famous Warren and Brandeis law review
article44 which called for the creation of a tort right of privacy.45
Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1976), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 1109 (1977); Porten v. University of San Francisco,
64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). For a brief discussion
of state constitutional privacy provisions, see PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra
at 1.
36. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976). However, the Supreme Court
stated that " 'zones of privacy' may be created by . . . specific constitutional
guarantees, thereby imposing limits upon government power." Id., citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 80 (1976) (where record-keeping requirements concerning abortions are "rea-
sonably directed" to their stated purpose of protecting maternal health, and "prop-
erly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy," they will be permitted to stand);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154 (states may "properly assert important interests in
safe-guarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life").
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154-55 (citing cases where state interests have
superseded privacy rights).
43. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888) ("[tihe right
to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone").
44. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under
the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential-to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Id. at 196.
45. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by The Supreme Court, 1979
SuP. CT. REV. 173, 177 [hereinafter cited as Posner].
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The notion of a constitutionally-based privacy right initially was
derived from explicit constitutional guarantees concerning search and
seizure, probable cause, self-incrimination and rights of association. 6
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,47 inspired the
modern trend by contending that there existed a constitutional "right
to be let alone, ' 4s despite the lack of an explicit constitutional
source. Thereafter, privacy law grew beyond protection of an in-
dividual's seclusion and physical privacy to become a general right
to be let alone.4 9
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court expanded its earlier
privacy holdings, finding a general constitutional right to privacy. 0
However, this right is not absolute;5 the degree to which it is legally
protected changes with the facts of each case. While the right has
expanded in recent years, 2 its limits have never been clearly defined
by the Supreme Court."
2. Supreme Court Decisions on Medical Records Privacy Issues
In the late 1970's, the Supreme Court twice examined privacy
issues in the context of medical records. In Whalen v. Roe, the
Court analyzed the constitutionality of a New York statute which
required records of all prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs to
be filed with the State Health Department.14 The record was required
46. For a discussion of the fourth amendment and development of privacy
rights, see D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 35-88 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as O'BRIEN]. For a discussion of the fifth amendment and privacy rights,
see id. at 89-137.
47. 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra note 31.
48. 277 U.S. at 478.
49. Posner, supra note 45, at 182.
50. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). This right was derived from zones of privacy
created by penumbras of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Id.; see O'BRIEN,
supra note 47, at 177 (calling constitutional right of privacy a per se right).
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (because privacy right
is not absolute, societal interests such as public health research may call for disclosure
of personal information).
52. For a discussion of the privacy interests for Which the Supreme Court has
found support in the Bill of Right's underlying right of privacy, see J.P. v. DeSanti,
653 F.2d 1080, 1087-91 (6th Cir. 1981).
53. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577.
54. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). New York State's Controlled Substances Act of 1972
was enacted in response to growing drug-abuse problems involving legitimate but
dangerous drugs being "diverted into, unlawful channels." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 3300 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-84). Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 591. Public
disclosure is prohibited by the statute. Id. at 594; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371
(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-84).
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to contain the name, address and age of patients obtaining the drugs,
as well as the prescribing physician, dispensing pharmacy, and the
drug and dosage prescribed. 5  The appellees56 contended that the
statute invaded patients' privacy by deterring those who legitimately
needed such drugs from seeking treatment to avoid being stigmatized
in public records as drug addicts. The Court, reviewing past privacy
cases, determined that at least two interests were involved: (1) avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters; and (2) independent decision-
making. 7 Both interests, the appellees argued, were violated by the
reporting statute. The Court disagreed, finding that the statute did
not interfere sufficiently with either interest to violate patients' con-
stitutional rights.8 The Whalen Court based its decision on four
grounds: (1) the statute itself provided for security against public
disclosure of the patients' names, and there was no reason to suspect
that these provisions would not function as intended; 9 (2) the nec-
essary disclosures to the Department of Health were not "mean-
ingfully distinguishable" from many other disclosures often required
for public health purposes; 60 (3) the argument that the statute would
deter legitimate use of the drugs was not sound; 61 and (4) the statute
did not deprive patients of their right to decide independently, with
the advice of their physicians, to use the medications.62
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,63 the
Court found that Missouri abortion-recording laws did not violate
women's privacy interests since: (1) women could still make abortion
decisions without government interference; (2) the recording require-
ments would not interfere with the physician-patient relationship;
(3) the records would be useful in maternal health issues; and (4)
the recording requirements would respect a patient's privacy rights. 64
Although the Court acknowledged a privacy interest in medical
records in both Whalen and Planned Parenthood, it decided that,
given sufficient protections against public disclosure, the individual's
55. 429 U.S. at 593.
56. Suit was brought by patients receiving such prescriptions, prescribing doctors
and two physician associations. Id. at 595.
57. Id. at 599-600.
58. Id. at 603-04.
59. Id. at 601-02.
60. Id. at 602. The Court gave these examples of other statutory reporting
requirements for public health purposes: venereal disease, child abuse, injuries
caused by deadly weapons, and certifications of fetal death. Id. at 602 n.29.
61. Id. at 603.
62. Id.
63. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64. Id. at 80-81.
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privacy interest sometimes may be sacrificed. 65 Important needs of
society, such as deterring drug abuse and preserving maternal health,
outweigh privacy interests. 66
Since these Supreme Court decisions, other federal and state courts
have considered issues pertaining to medical records privacy inter-
ests. 67 In each instance, the issue has remained a balancing of the
public's need for information against the individual's privacy in-
terest.
68
B. Common Law Protections
Common law privacy actions for damages or injunctive relief may
be employed when an individual believes that another party, private
individual or institution, has illegitimately obtained, disclosed or used
the plaintiff's medical information. 69 However, if the challenged
conduct is privileged the wrong is not actionable. 70 Common law
privacy actions also may be available against government bodies or
65. An invasion of privacy interests is not automatically impermissible in the
face of a reasonable exercise of a state's police power. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
at 598, 602.
66. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
67. Part III, infra, discusses critical factors in determining whether to disclose
medical records.
68. See Consumers Union of U.S. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 590
F.2d 1209, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 375, 386-87
(1980); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 313-17 (1979); United States
v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578-80 (3d Cir. 1980); G.M.C. v. Director of Nat'l
Institute, 636 F.2d 163, 165-66 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1980); United
States v. Lasco Industries, 531 F. Supp. 256, 263-64 (N.D. Texas 1981).
69. Watson, Disclosure of Computerized Health Care Information: Provider
Privacy Rights Under Supply Side Competition, 7 AM. J. LAW & MED. 265, 282
(1981). For a discussion of reasons for the traditional separation of legal protections
against governmental and private intrusions on privacy, see GREENAWALT, supra
note 4, at viii-ix. Fundamentally, the desire for freedom from government inter-
ference, which was essential to American political ideals and form of government,
is the heart of this distinction; it was critical enough to require constitutional
attention. Private interferences with privacy, on the other hand, were not "perceived
as compelling." Id. at ix.
70. A privilege is a defense to tort. It differs from an immunity because it
only avoids tort liability in certain circumstances, while an immunity does so under
all circumstances. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. If the "circumstances make it just and reasonable
that the liability shall not be imposed, [they will] go to defeat the existence of the
tort itself." Id. On the other hand, immunity does not deny the tort, just the
liability. The defense of privilege may be based upon consent, necessity, or the
fact that defendant was "performing a function" of such importance that the tort
committed was not actionable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF TORTS].
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officials where the act complained of is not protected by the doctrine
of immunity.7 Common law medical records privacy actions have
succeeded occasionally .71 Nevertheless, many commentators believe
such remedies are inadequate.7"
Common law protections for sensitive medical information include
actions for invasion of privacy, 74 defamation,75 breach of confi-
71. Immunity from tort liability is a protection applicable to various classes of
defendants for policy reasons, based on the status, position or interests represented
by the defendant. While not denying the tort, immunity "avoids" the resulting
liability. PROSSER, supra note 70, at 970. Some examples of immunities are charitable,
family and governmental. Governmental immunity is based on the premise that
legal rights cannot exist against the authority which makes those rights. Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). This immunity is derived originally from
the divine right of kings. Under that doctrine the government may not be sued
without its consent. PROSSER, supra note 70, at 970-71. However, governmental
immunity is being eroded on the federal, state and municipal levels by statute and
judicial decisions which make the relevant government body liable for some tortious
conduct of its employees. The government is said to have "consented" to suit.
See, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982). On the state
level, some governmental immunities have been statutorily waived. PROSSER, supra
note 70, at 975-76.
Municipal corporations have a "dual character" for tort immunity purposes.
They are both corporations and governments. In their governmental capacity, they
are immune, while in their proprietary capacity, they may be liable. Id. at 977-
78. Government activities carried out for public health protection, for example
operating hospitals, generally have been found to be governmental in nature. Id.
at 979-80, citing Butler v. City of Kansas City, 97 Kan. 239, 155 P. 12 (1916).
Contra, City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942).
72. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text; see also Le Blang, Invasion
of Privacy: Medical Practice and the Tort of Intrusion, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 205,
219 (1979) (where physician is responsible for intrusions on patient's solitude, he
may -be liable for money damages in tort).
73. See Note, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265, 286-89 (1981). Skeptics' views are based on the
following grounds: patients have no legal interest in (i.e., they do not own) their
records; the physician-patient relationship is no longer significant in terms of
informational privacy; common law actions are not easily applied to the majority
of offenders such as insurance companies, epidemiologists and hospitals; and the
patient may never learn of the disclosure even though he may be injured by it.
Id. at 287-88. For example, disclosure of an individual's epilepsy to a prospective
employer might influence the employer not to hire him.
74. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 70, §§ 652A-652E. Most American
jurisdictions now recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. Id. § 652A comment
(a). This tort shares its historical roots with the constitutional right to privacy,
described supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
There are four types of privacy invasions generally recognized by tort law: (1)
an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of
another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private
life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the
public. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 70, § 652A.
With respect to intrusion, Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
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denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969) extended the tort of invasion of privacy to cover
intrusion. The Restatement also states that the intrusion type of privacy invasion
does not require publicity or publication: "It consists solely of an intentional
interference with [an individual's] interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his
person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 70, § 652B
comment (a). Comment (b) states:
The invasion may be by . . . some . . . form of investigation or
examination into [an individual's] private concerns, as by opening his
private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining
his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to
permit an inspection of his personal documents.
Id. at comment (b). These definitions indicate that an intrusion action could prove
useful where the plaintiff's medical records are improperly disclosed.
Regarding appropriation as an invasion of privacy, the Restatement indicates
that commercial appropriation is not required. As long as the defendant has used
plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, he is liable. RES-
TATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 70, § 652C comment (a). In some states this form
of protection is statutory. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney
1976) (protecting against commercial appropriation). In New York, there is no
common law protection against appropriation. Delan by Delan v. CBS, 91 A.D.2d
255, 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (2d Dep't 1983). At common law, a cause of
action for violation of the right of privacy is not cognizable in New York State.
Id.
As to unreasonable publicity, the matter publicized must be (a) "highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (b) not of legitimate concern to the public." RES-
TATEMENT OF Torts, supra note 70, § 652D. Thus, in a medical records case, part
(b) might be the critical factor because of the difficulty in showing that a medical
matter is not of legitimate concern to the public. For example, consider the highly
publicized case, United States v. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). University Hospital involved a third
party's challenge of the choice of medical treatment made by parents of a critically
ill newborn.
The Justice Department, representing the Department of Health and Human
Services, had requested the infant's medical file, contending that it was necessary
to have access to the file to determine if she was being discriminated against
because of her handicap. The district court denied the request, stating that the
parents' choice was a reasonable one. Id. at 616.
Before the Justice Department brought suit, the case had gone through the New
York State courts. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d
685 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983). The original action
was brought by an unrelated party in order to obtain a court order directing the
hospital to follow a different course of treatment than that chosen by the parents
with medical advice. 60 N.Y.2d at 210. The New York Court of Appeals found
no justification for "entertainment of these proceedings." Id. at 213. Based on
the definitions of privacy invasions described supra, the parents and the infant in
a situation like the Weber case may have a cause of action against the individual
who initially brought unreasonable publicity to their plight.
75. Defamation is the holding up of a person to ridicule, scorn or contempt
in a respectable and considerable part of the community by publication of false
information. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 111. It includes both libel and slander.
Id.; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 70, §§ 559, 563. For example, a libel
action was brought against a psychiatrist who had revealed information about his
patient (the plaintiff) in a letter to a physician who then passed the information
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dence, 76 breach of statutory duty,77 breach of fiduciary duty, 78 breach
of contract, 79 and tortious interference with a contractual relation-
on to the parents of plaintiff's fiancee. Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d
814 (1958).
Truth is a defense to defamation actions. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 116. In
addition, the publication may be privileged. Id. at § 115. For a list of commentaries
on defamation regarding confidential medical information, see Watson, supra note
69, at 287 n.138.
76. A breach of confidence action may be based upon a duty arising out of
the physician-patient relationship. While there is no common law physician-patient
privilege, state statutes creating such a privilege may provide the basis for this
action. See, e.g., Rhode Island's Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act,
R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 5-37.3-1 - 5-37.3-11 (Supp. 1983). Even without the statutory
privilege, however, some courts have acknowledged a cause of action for breach
of the confidential relationship which arises out of the Hippocratic Oath, professional
ethics, and laws governing physicians' conduct. See Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d
791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960); Alexander v. Knight, 197
Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash.
441, 162 P. 572 (1917). Liability was not recognized in Collins v. Howard, 156
F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957); Hammer v. Polsky, 36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d
110 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389
S.W.2d 249 (1965).
77. Cases in which patients have brought actions for breach of statutory duty
against physicians who revealed confidential medical data include: Hammonds v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (case brought against
physician's malpractice insurer for inducing physician to breach this duty); Simonsen
v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc.
773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1944), aff'd, 269 A.D. 970, 58
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1st Dep't 1945); Schaffer v. Spicer, 88 S.D. 36, 215 N.W.2d 134
(1974). The statutes invoked in these cases support the public policy of encouraging
"a free flow of communication between physician and patient" which is required
for optimal medical treatment. Watson, supra note 69, at 283. An example of a
relevant statute is Nebraska's provision for revocation of a physician's license should
he betray "professional secret[s] to the detriment of the patient." Britton, supra
note 3, at 32, citing NEBl. REV. STAT. § 71-148 (1981); see also Abelson's Inc. v.
New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867 (1950).
78. A fiduciary duty is "a duty, created by [an individual's] undertaking, to
act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking."
Watson, supra note 69, at 285 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 13
(1959)). Courts generally have required three elements before finding this relationship
to exist: (1) that one party has special knowledge upon which the other relies; (2)
that the party with knowledge exploits it for financial gain; and (3) that the reliant
party suffers injury. Watson, supra note 69, at 285. Cases indicating that the
physician's fiduciary duty to the patient encompasses a duty of confidentiality are
Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Carnell v. Medical & Surgical Clinic, 21 Ill. App. 3d 383, 385, 315 N.E.2d 278,
280 (1974).
79. The contract arises out of the agreement of the patient to pay the medical
care provider for treatment. Watson, supra note 69, at 292-93. Occasionally, the
agreement will include express provisions protecting confidentiality. These are more
likely to be found in psychotherapist-patient agreements than in physician-patient
agreements. Id. at 293.
Whether or not there is an express provision for confidentiality, courts may infer
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ship.80 The focus in these causes of action, excluding those for
invasion of privacy,8" is on the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion,82 rather than on the medical records themselves.
Common law privacy cases have been held to be actionable
where a physician discloses confidential information about his patient83
by publishing articles,8 4 photos,85 or films,8 6 often accompanied by
an implied duty of confidentiality, based upon traditional ethical considerations
applying to physicians, of which the public has knowledge. See, e.g., Horne v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 711, 287 So. 2d 824, 832 (1973); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d
559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. New York County), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307
N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1973). This public knowledge may be based on:
the Hippocratic Oath, supra note 2; the AMA's Principles of Ethics, supra note
2; medical licensing requirements, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1401(8)(a),
32-1422(A)(4) (Supp. 1977-83); and custom and practice, Watson supra note 69,
at 293-94. See also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D.
Ohio 1965); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Alexander v.
Knight, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649, aff'd, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1961);
Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543, 549 (1940) (contract between patient
and physician contains many implied provisions which may include duty of trust
or confidence); Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom,
36 U. CIN. L. REV. 103 (1967).
80. This common law action requires the existence of a contract, defendant's
knowledge of its terms, and his unjustified intent to interfere. Watson, supra note
69, at 296. Causes of action could conceivably arise from interferences with contracts
between patient and physician, patient and insurer, and patient and hospital. For
discussions of this tort, see Watson, supra note 69, at 296-98; Rosen, Signing
Away Medical Privacy, 3 Cirv. Lm. REV. 54 (Oct/Nov 1976); Note, Medical Data
Privacy: Automated Interference with Contractual Relations, 25 BtUFALO L. REV.
491 (1976).
81. Specifically, the intrusion type of privacy invasion could focus on medical
records. See supra note 74.
82. Privacy Protection Commission, supra note 23, at 20. For a discussion of
developing common law protections against disclosure of confidential medical in-
formation, see id. at 25-27.
83. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D.
Ohio 1965).
84. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (suit
against magazine which published plaintiff's name and described her strange illness
without her consent).
85. See, e.g., Griffen v. Medical Soc. of N.Y., 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d
109 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939). Griffen concerned a suit under New York's
privacy statute, supra note 75, alleging the publication of plaintiff's photo accom-
panying an article written by defendant physicians without plaintiff's consent. The
court concluded that the complaint was not sufficient to determine whether the
article was scientific (in which case defendant would not be liable) or an adver-
tisement. See also Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940) (enjoining
physician from printing photos taken of plaintiff's disfigured face while she was
unconscious; it was an invasion of privacy, whether or not publication had occurred).
86. See, e.g., Feeney v. Young, 191 A.D. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1st Dep't 1920).
In this case, plaintiff consented to film being made of her Caesarean section
operation, to be shown only for scientific medical purposes. Plaintiff had a cause
of action against physician for invasion of privacy under New York's privacy statute
when the film was shown as part of a commercial film.
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the patient's name. 7
Defenses may be available against common law actions for dis-
closure of confidential information. For example, if the breach of
confidence is necessary to protect *the community or an important
public interest, the complaint may not be actionable as where the
plaintiff is mentally ill" or has a contagious disease. 9 Other instances
might occur where the medical care provider has a higher duty which
compels disclosure. 9° Where disclosure is to the patient's spouse9' or
is required by law, 92 it may not be actionable. In some jurisdictions,
disclosure is not actionable unless it was made with malice or intent
to harm.93
C. Statutory Protections
In the last decade, legislative attention has been focused on privacy
issues. 94 Statutory protections have been implemented on both the
state95 and federal levels. 96 Some statutes apply solely to governmental
87. In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1207, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942),
the court noted that medical purposes were not served by publishing plaintiff's
name along with information about her illness.
88. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal. App. 2d 799, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
89. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
90. E.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (duty to disclose
existence of infant's pathological heart condition to insurer to whom parents applied
for insurance on infant's life).
91. See, e.g., Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617
(La. Ct. App. 1963), writ refused, 244 La. 1019, 156 So. 2d 226; Curry v. Corn,
52 Misc. 2d 1035, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
92. See, e.g., Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173, 150 S.W.2d 648 (1941) (physician
refusing to disclose while testifying in court would have been held in contempt).
93. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 244, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
94. The Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), established the
Privacy Protection Study Commission which targeted privacy interests for legislative
protection. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 70. The Commission stated that personal
medical records were "one of the most sensitive areas of recordkeeping" they had
examined. S.503 & S.865, supra note 25, at 2.
For Congressional and administrative viewpoints and statements of concerned
parties on the issue of privacy in medical records, see H.R. 5935, supra note 2;
Confidentiality of Medical Records, supra note 3; S.504 & S.865, supra note 25.
95. See infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
96. See Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). The Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems stated in 1973
that: "it is for the legislative and administrative rulemaking bodies to balance
individual privacy interests with the needs of society and record-keeping organi-
zations." SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 65 (quoting 1973 H.E.W. Report).
However, recognizing the limitation on medical records protection provided by
the Act, the Privacy Protection Study Commission in 1977 recommended legislation
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record-keeping activities, 97 while others reach only the private sector.98
On the federal level, this Note focuses on the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974. 99 Recently,
Congress considered legislation specifically designed to protect in-
formation contained in medical records."l° The proposed legislation
was not enacted, however, primarily because of fears that critical
health care and law enforcement functions might be impeded.' 0'
1. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
The FOIA's purpose is to permit public access to federal records. 02
It is premised on the notion that a truly informed public is important
to a democratic form of government. 0 3 Prior to enactment of the
FOIA, access to and disclosure of federal records were irregular as
was judicial treatment of these issues.' °4 Under the FOIA, access is
now permitted, and even encouraged, to the extent that the public's
right to know outweighs the agency's need to preserve confiden-
specifically tailored to protect confidentiality of medical records not covered by
the Act. Privacy Protection Commission Report, supra note 23, at 1-3 (remarks
of Sen. Ribicoff). Legislation was then introduced, but not enacted, in both the
House and Senate. See supra note 25.
97. The FOIA and Privacy Act apply to federal agencies, thus covering insti-
tutions providing health care and records maintained for Medicare and Medicaid
programs. SCHIJCHMAN, supra note 2, at 66. The Privacy Act also applies to records
maintained by government contractors who carry out agency functions, hence
covering insurance companies involved in the Medicare program. Id.
98. There are some federal statutes that protect against privacy invasions by
the private sector. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-
1681t (1982), regulates private persons or organizations regularly collecting and
reporting on individuals for purposes of credit, insurance or employment.
Some states also have fair credit reporting statutes not vastly different from the
federal law. See, e.g., CAL. Ciy. CODE §§ 1785.13, 1786.18 (West Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-431 to 36-435 (1983). See generally Privacy Law in the
States, supra note 35, at 7-11.
99. Although there are other statutes affecting privacy rights in medical records,
see supra notes 94-98, this Note is only concerned with the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
100. See supra note 25.
101. For statements of law enforcement and health care providers in opposition
to the concept of medical records confidentiality, see the Congressional Hearings
cited supra notes 2 and .3.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2418.
103. See 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2423; Washington Post Co.
v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 264-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
104. Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1213-
14 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc. v.
Consumers Union of the United States Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1980).
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tiality. 105 The FOIA's dominant objective is disclosure rather than
secrecy. '0 However, the FOIA also specifies exemptions for certain
materials such as those relating to national security, trade secrets
and personnel and medical files.10 7 Whether or not disclosure of any
of these exempted classes of materials is permissible must be de-
termined according to other sources of law, including statutes, reg-
ulations, administrative common law and general principles of equity. 108
These statutory exemptions must be narrowly construed in order to
effectuate the legislative intent. 0 9 One exemption specifically exempts
medical files "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""10
When a party makes a FOIA request for medical files held by
a government agency, that agency must determine whether to release
or withhold the information."' This determination involves a de-
termination of: (1) whether the material is a medical file, thus
governed by the medical records exemption, and (2) assuming it is,
whether disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
individual privacy." 2 The second question entails weighing the in-
dividual's interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in
disclosure."' In light of the legislative intent to subject more federal
records to public scrutiny, courts have interpreted this balance to
105. Id. at 1214.
106. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
108. Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1215.
109. See E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); Consumers Union, 590 F.2d
at 1214.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982). This exemption applies to "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. Once the medical records exemption
is found to apply, the Privacy Act comes into play. See infra notes 130-32 and
accompanying text for an explanation of the interaction of these two acts. Medical
files are not to be exempted from disclosure unless disclosure would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1976).
111. See discussion supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text; see, e.g., De-
partment of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); E.P.A. v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73 (1973). The FOIA and Privacy Acts are not applicable to medical records
held by a private doctor or health care facility. The records may be obtained from
private entities by anyone (attorneys, insurance companies, the patient himself) with
written authorization of the patient. Telephone interview with Medical Records
Custodian at New York Hospital and at New York University Medical Center,
both in New York City (August 20, 1984).




tip in favor of disclosure."11 Agency refusal to disclose is subject to
judicial review by the Federal District Court which undertakes the
same two-step analysis performed by the agency." 5
On the other hand, should the agency grant disclosure, the subject
of the record may bring an action in federal district court contending
that the medical records exemption precluded disclosure." 6 Under
such circumstances, one circuit court of appeals has concluded that
the individual has a "legally cognizable interest" in the privacy of
his records." 7 The court held that a party whose records have been
disclosed by an agency may sue to determine the legality of the
disclosure."18 In these cases, the court would follow the two-step
FOIA analysis."19 If the court finds that the FOIA does not govern,
it would consider outside sources of law in order to decide whether
or not disclosure is warranted.' 20
2. The Privacy Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress enacted the Privacy Act to counter the disclosure
encouraged by the FOIA.' 21 Congress stated that the right to privacy
is "personal and fundamental."' The Privacy Act, which is intended
114. Id. at 261.
115. Should the agency decide not to comply with the disclosure request, the
FOIA expressly provides for Federal District Court intervention to enforce its
purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982); see Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1338
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969). "Where a purely medical file is withheld under the authority
of [the medical records exemption to the FOIA] it will be for the District Court
ultimately to determine any dispute as to whether that exemption was properly
invoked." 420 F.2d at 1340.
116. This is assuming the subject is aware his records have been requested. An
accounting of disclosures made under the Privacy Act must be kept. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(c) (1982). Disclosures allowed under the Pricacy Act are listed in § 552a(b).
Most accountings of disclosures must be made "available to the individual named
in the record at his request." Id. In addition, an agency is supposed to make
reasonable efforts to notify individuals when records pertaining to them have been
disclosed. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8) (1982). For cases concerning so-called reverse FOIA
suits, see Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1215 nn.27 & 28.
117. Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1215; cf Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. at 379 (courts are to determine de novo whether the exemption
was properly used).
118. See Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1215 (citing Charles River Park "A,"
Inc. v. H.U.D., 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Planning Research Corp.
v. F.P.C., 555 F.2d 970, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
119. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
120. Consumers Union, 590 F.2d at 1216.
121. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
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to "promote governmental respect for the privacy of citizens,"' 23
requires government agencies and employers to comply with con-
stitutional mandates when collecting, storing, using and disclosing
personal information.12
4
The Privacy Act forbids agency disclosure of records maintained
on individuals except in certain specified situations 2 ' or when the
subject of the record has granted written permission.126 It provides
that an individual may have access to his record127 and permits him
to request amendment of the record should he find it inaccurate,
irrelevant, untimely or incomplete.'2 8 The Privacy Act states explicitly
that "the term 'record' means any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency,
including, . . . his . . . medical history ... "29
The FOIA medical records exemption and the Privacy Act are
not, however, contradictory but rather are complementary. If the
two-stage determination mandated by the exemption results in a
finding that disclosure would "constitute a clearly unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy," then the FOIA relieves the record from
"obligatory disclosure."' 30 At this point, the Privacy Act becomes
operative, prohibiting disclosure unless the subject of the record gives
written consent.' The Privacy Act gives individuals some limited
control over their medical records which are held by government
agencies. This control is significant because it sharply contrasts with
123. S. REP. No. 1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 74 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916, 6916. "The Act drew upon 'the constitutional and
judicial recognition afforded to the right of privacy and translate[d] it into a system
of procedural and substantive safeguards against obtrusive government information-
gathering practices.' " Leib v. Veterans Admin., 546 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D.D.C.
1982) (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 40410 (Dec. 17, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Percy)).
124. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6916, 6916.
125. These situations include requests by Congress, the Census Bureau, and by
law enforcement authorities and statistical researchers. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982). This section provides in part:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure
of the record would be [to certain specified persons or entities].
Id.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (1982).
128. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2) (1982).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1982).
130. Florida Medical Ass'n v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 479 F. Supp.
1291, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982)).
131. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)).
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the common law under which the doctor or health care institution
owns, and therefore legally controls the patient's medical records.132
3. State Statutory Protections
a. Open Records and Privacy Statutes
A number of states have enacted open records and privacy statutes.'33
Privacy protections created by these statutes are available where the
requested medical record is held by a state agency or state-funded
entity in situations in which analogous federal laws are applicable., 4
Such laws generally have the same purpose as their federal coun-
terparts: to regulate government "collection, maintenance, use and
disclosure" of personal information. 3 ' In addition to the privacy
and open records statutes, there are many other relevant state laws
which may be useful to an individual in protecting medical records
from disclosure.116 These state laws are not applicable to federal
132. Winslade, supra note 17, at 507 (stating that medical records custodians
own and legally control patient medical records).
133. Examples of state privacy protection statutes are the following: CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1798.1 to 1798.76 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-190 to 4-
197 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-6-1 to 4-1-6-9 (Burns 1982 & Supp. 1984);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 66A, §§ 1-3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13.01 to 13.87 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1983-84); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01 to 1347.99
(Page 1979 & Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to 2.1-386 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
Examples of state open-records, or freedom of information laws are: ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-2801 to 12-2807 (1979 & Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265,
9070-9079 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-10005
(1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70 to 50-18-74 (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 68A.1 to 68A.9 (West 1973 & Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 61.870 to
61.884 (1980 & Supp. 1984); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.231 to 15.246 (West
1981 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. Puu. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1983-
1984); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1984); and VA. CODE §§ 2.1-
340 to 2.1-346.1 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
Also relevant are the Information Practices Acts. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-2-59 to 63-2-89 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
134. See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
135. PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra note 35, at 2.
136. Provisions protecting privacy, providing for access, or providing for dis-
closure of medical records may be found in a great variety of state laws. Some
examples are: (1) Medical Information Confidentiality Acts, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-501 to 32-505 (1981
& Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1319 to 53-1331 (1977 & Supp. 1982);
and (2) Mental Health Information Acts, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2001 to 6-
2076 (1981).
Other useful state provisions may be found in statutes regulating: (1) insurance
practices, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 791-791.26 (West Supp. 1984); (2) health statistics
data collection practices, e.g., Illinois Health Statistics Act §§ 1-11, ILL. REV. STAT.
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agencies, and it should be noted that they differ markedly in type
and extent of protection from the federal statutes.13 7
ch. 111-1/2, §§ 5601-5611 (Supp. 1984-1985); (3) hospital records, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7(D) (West 1982); (4) Patients' Bill of Rights, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.651(16) (West Supp. 1984); (5) voluntary and involuntary sterilization
of the mentally retarded, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 8713 (Supp. 1984); and
(6) confidentiality promised upon submission to drug and alcohol rehabilitation,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN., § 69.54.070 (Supp. 1984-1985).
The vast array of state legislative responses to the issue of privacy in medical
records has prompted the American Medical Association to prepare a model bill
for state legislatures to follow, adopt or consider, with the hope that some consistency
will result. MODEL STATE LEGISLATION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN-
FORMATION, American Medical Ass'n (1976).
The numerous and inconsistent state privacy protections, and their inapplicability
to federal government activities, have caused many to argue that privacy protections
must be governed federally. H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 7.
137. For a discussion of the federal privacy and open records laws, see supra
notes 103-33 and accompanying text. A thorough analysis of these state statutes
is beyond the scope of this Note. Cases involving two different types of statutes
are discussed below.
Koudsi v. Hennepin County Medical Center concerned disclosure of information
to callers by a medical center's Patient Information operator. 317 N.W.2d 705
(Minn. 1982). The patient had requested that this information be kept confidential.
The question asked by the court was whether the disclosure violated either Min-
nesota's Data Privacy Act (DPA) or its Patient's Bill of Rights (PBR). Id. at 707
(citing MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162 to 15.167 (1978) (current version at §§ 13.01 to
13.10); MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (1980) (amended 1983)).
Analyzing the PBR's applicability, the court found that it was not intended to
apply in a case like this. Id. The PBR was intended to protect medical records,
which are information stored "in a form ensuring a degree of permanence." Id.
While oral communication of such information might be a violation of the PBR,
the information given out by the operator, stating that respondent had given birth
and then been discharged from the hospital, was not a violation. Id.
Turning to the DPA, the court found that it did not protect the contested
information because no law operated to place it in a " 'private' " or " 'confi-
dential' " category; only private or confidential information was protected by this
Act. Id. at 707-08 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 15.162(2a), (5a) (1978) (current version
at § 13.02(3), (12)). It would only be considered private or confidential if a "statute
or federal law" operated to make it so. Id. at 708; accord Minnesota Medical
Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1978) (Department of Public Welfare
may furnish abortion data regarding medical assistance recipients to publishing
company without violating DPA because there is no federal or state statute or law
showing these records to be confidential or private).
In contrast to Koudsi, John P. v. Whalen, 54 N.Y.2d 89, 429 N.E.2d 117, 444
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1981), demonstrates the protection afforded by a state privacy statute
where data was considered confidential by operation of a state or federal statute.
This case concerned an investigation of a physician by the New York State Board
of Professional Medical Conduct. Pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information
Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), the physician
requested medical records which the commissioner had obtained during the inves-
tigation. The New York Court of Appeals held that these records were exempt
from disclosure under that statute because they were confidential materials under
the Public Health Law. Id. at 98, 429 N.E.2d at 122, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 603. New
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b. Physician-Patient Privilege
Another aspect of state law affecting medical records is the phy-
sician-patient privilege.'38 This privilege, which has never been rec-
ognized at common law, is purely statutory. 3 9 The privilege is intended
York's Public Health Law authorizes the state board for professional medical
conduct to "examine and obtain records of patients in any investigation or pro-
ceeding," and provides that the patient's name shall remain confidential unless
expressly waived by the patient. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)() (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1984). Furthermore, the statute provides that the other information in
the record may be disclosed where required for "proper function of the board and
the New York state board of regents" or "pursuant to a valid court order." Id.
In the New York Freedom of Information Law there is also a provision for
deleting portions of material whose disclosure would otherwise constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(2)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1985). However, the New York Court of Appeals has held that deletion
may not be used to avoid withholding of materials that are statutorily exempted
from the disclosure mandate. Short v. Nassau Medical Center, 57 N.Y.2d 399, 442
N.E.2d 1235, 456 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1982).
Clearly, state privacy and open records acts vary with regard to disclosure or
withholding of information contained in medical records. Given that the underlying
purpose of open records statutes is to encourage public access, courts are not likely
to uphold nondisclosure unless it is required by a confidentiality or privacy statute
or a specific exemption to the open records law. Some statutes, such as New
York's, supra, expressly define disclosure of medical records to be an unwarranted
invasion of privacy. Under other statutes, a more difficult burden is placed on the
subject of the record, requiring a showing that disclosure would invade constitutional
privacy rights. Theoretically, the purposes of the privacy statutes conflict with those
of the open records acts. In practice, however, it appears that reasonable com-
promises are possible which would allow disclosure for legitimate needs after sensitive
or identifiable information is deleted.
138. For example, New York's physician-patient privilege is created by N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 4504(a) (McKinney Supp. 1964-1983) which reads:
Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice
medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing or
dentistry shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he
acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. The relationship of a
physician and patient shall exist between a medical corporation, as defined
in article forty-four of the public health law, a professional service
corporation organized under article fifteen of the business corporation
law to practice medicine, and the patients to whom they respectively
render professional medical services.
Id. The physician-patient privilege does not exist in federal or state common law.
G.M.C. v. Director of Nat'l Inst., 636 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 877 (1981).
139. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 602 n.28. Where such a privilege exists, the
communication from patient to physician is "privileged," and is only relevant when
the medical provider (or his records) is subpoenaed "as a witness in a trial,
administrative proceeding, legislative hearing, etc., to divulge" these communica-
tions; the privilege forbids disclosure of the confidential information without the
patient's consent. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 18. The privilege is different from
the concept of "confidential communications," which has been defined as a phy-
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to promote trust and confidence in the physician-patient relation-
ship. 140 A confidential relationship is believed to facilitate optimal
treatment because it encourages the patient to disclose all relevant
information, even that which may be embarrassing or humiliating.' 4'
In general, the privilege is available only to the patient to protect
his medical records from disclosure during discovery 142 or at trial, 43
or to prevent his physician from testifying about information obtained
in treatment. 144 Some courts have held that a hospital, physician or
representative of the patient may assert the privilege on behalf of
the patient.145 However, this privilege may not be employed to protect
the privacy of the physician or hospital. 146 For example, a physician
sician's duty "to maintain the confidentiality" of his patient. Id. at 17. This duty
is imposed upon the physician by the ethics of his profession, and in somejurisdictions, by law. Thus, violation of this duty may give rise to common law
causes of action. Id. at 18. See supra notes 69-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of common law causes of action pertinent to medical records issues.
140. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 24; Schaffer v. Spicer, 88 S.D. 36, 39-40,
215 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (1974); In re June 1979 Allegheny Cty. Inv. Gr. Jury,
490 Pa. 143, 149, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (1980).
141. SCHUCHMAN, supra note 2, at 24.
142. See, e.g., Roberts v. Superior Court of Butte County, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 342,
508 P.2d 309, 319, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316-17 (1973); Eberle v. Savon Food Stores,
Inc., 30 Mich. App. 496, 501, 186 N.W.2d 837, 839, (1971); Wenninger v. Muesing,
307 Minn. 405, 406-08, 240 N.W.2d 333, 334-35 (1976); Heinemann v. Mitchell,
8 Ohio Misc. 390, 392, 220 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1964).
143. See, e.g., Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Colo. 188, 193, 247 P.2d 813, 816
(1952); Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 842, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354-56 (1958).
144. See, e.g., Pollitt v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 95 F.R.D. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio
1982) (Ohio's privilege statute prohibits physician from testifying about information
given him by his patient during treatment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)
(Page 1981).
145. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d
130, 135, 450 N.E.2d 678, 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (1983) (hospital or physician
may assert privilege for benefit of patient, if not waived by patient); People v.
Doe, 86 A.D.2d 672, 672, 446 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 452 N.Y.S.2d
361 (1982) (privilege may be asserted by patient, physician or hospital "on behalf
of the patient in criminal proceedings"); Judd v. Park Ave. Hospital, 37 Misc.
2d 614, 615-17, 235 N.Y.S.2d 843,, 845-47 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County), aff'd, 18
A.D.2d 766, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (4th Dep't 1962); Boggess v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
128 Ga. App. 190, 193, 196 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (deceased patient's
widow did not waive physician-patient privilege by suing for death benefits from
insurance policy).
146. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga Cty., 59 N.Y.2d at 135, 450
N.E.2d at 680, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (physician and hospital may not assert privilege
to protect themselves from criminal proceedings arising out of crime committed
against patient); In re Weiss, 208 Misc. 1010, 1012, 147 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1955) (hospital cannot prevent patient from inspecting his
own records pursuant to a discovery request); Cynthia B. v. New Rochelle Medical
Center, 60 N.Y.2d 452, 454-55, 458 N.E.2d 363, 364-65, 470 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123-
24 (1983) (where former psychiatric patient moved to compel discovery of own
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or hospital may not assert the privilege to evade a patient's request
for his own records in a negligence action against them.1 47 On the
other hand, physicians and hospitals may assert the privilege on
behalf of non-plaintiff patients whose records are sought in a legal
action. 141
The physician-patient privilege may be waived expressly by the
patient.' 49 Waiver may also be implied, for example, when an in-
dividual puts his medical records in issue by bringing a personal
injury action.'50 This type of waiver pertains only to the part of
the record relating to the injury at issue, rather than to the entire
record.' 5 ' The privilege is further limited by statutory and common
-law exceptions which have been created where important public
interests are at stake and where the intrusion on patient privacy
interests would be minor.'5 2
.psychiatric records, court ordered full disclosure; court also held that treating
hospital or physician who is custodian of records may be granted protective order
on ground that disclosure "may be seriously detrimental to the interests of the
patient, to uninvolved third parties or to an important program of the custodian
of the records, notwithstanding a valid waiver of the physician-patient privilege").
147. See, e.g., Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty Hosp., 396 F.2d 931,
935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("medical professionals can and should vigilantly safeguard
the patient's secrets from unauthorized scrutiny . . . . But we could not justify
a refusal to yield the information to a qualified recipient, whether or not it stems
from the dictates of self-protection"); Young v. King, 136 N.J. Super. 127, 130,
344 A.2d 792, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).
148. See, e.g., Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Il. App. 3d 850, 853,
435 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Il1. App. Ct. 1982) (in malpractice and drug liability suit,
hospital could assert non-party patient's statutory privilege protecting records from
disclosure); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
149. See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Rowles, 21 Ariz. App. 424, 429,
520 P.2d 518, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (patient must expressly waive privilege
in order to allow disclosure of confidential information).
150. See, e.g., Lambdin v. Leopard, 20 Ohio Misc. 189, 192, 251 N.E.2d 165,
167 (Ct. Common Pleas 1968) (by bringing personal injury action, plaintiff is
deemed to have waived privilege by conduct).
151. See, e.g., Britt v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 20 Cal. 3d 844,
863-64, 574 P.2d 766, 778-79, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 707-08 (Cal. Super. 1978) (lawsuit
which puts in issue physical or mental condition of plaintiff does not constitute
waiver of confidentiality of plaintiff's past and unrelated treatment).
152. See, e.g., New York's specific exceptions to the privilege: N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW § 4504(b) (McKinney Supp. 1964 & 1983) (identification by dentist of patients;
identification by physician, dentist or nurse of victims of a crime who are under
16 years of age); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 4504(c) (McKinney Supp. 1964 & 1983)
(concerning mental or physical condition of deceased patient); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT
§ 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 1983) (no privilege exists in child abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3373 (McKinney 1977) (no privilege exists in
duty to disclose information regarding controlled substances); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(3)(h) (McKinney 1983) (privilege not available to exclude evidence in
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III. Analysis of Factors Critical to Medical Records Access
Due to the multitude of variables involved, no simple formula
can correlate purposes for seeking medical records with results one
might expect. These variables include (1) the variety of methods for
obtaining records, ranging from discovery requests, FOIA requests,
grand jury and administrative warrants and subpoenas, to self-help
such as simple requests to the record custodian, and even theft; (2)
the different privacy interests invoked, based on constitutional, com-
mon law or statutorily conferred rights, and their concomitant meth-
ods of protection; and (3) the classes to which the seeking party
and the subject of the record belong, that is, the government agency
or private entity. For example, suppose an individual's employer has
maintained health records on the employee. The National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) might subpoena those
records for an occupational health investigation. Perhaps a fellow
employee will request the records through discovery for a malpractice
action against a physician they had in common. An insurance com-
pany might wish to use the records to avoid payment on a policy.
The records might be used to impeach the subject's credibility if he
testifies adversely at a criminal trial. A relative might wish to obtain
the records to show the subject was incompetent when executing his
will. If the facts are further changed so that the medical records
are in the possession of the individual's physician rather than his
employer, in a state which statutorily protects the physician-patient
privilege, an entirely new analysis is demanded. In each situation,
different procedures and laws may govern.
Five factors must be analyzed in a discussion of privacy interests
guardianship or custody proceedings of destitute or dependent children); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1980) (misdemeanor for doctor or hospital not to report
knife or firearm-caused wounds which may result in death).
Non-statutory exceptions have been found, for example, in child custody and
neglect cases. See, e.g., In re Doe Children, 93 Misc. 2d 479, 481-82, 402 N.Y.S.2d
958, 960 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1978) (childrens' interest in being free from
abuse and neglect outweighs privacy interests of parent in medical records). Contra,
Koshman v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 297, 168
Cal. Rptr. 558, 559-60 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (records regarding mother's
narcotics overdose not discoverable by father in child custody proceeding).
See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d 525, 531 (R.I. 1982) (importance
of Medicaid program requires obstacles such as the physician-patient privilege to
fall); In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 115 F. Supp. 643, 645 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) (mere revelation that patient had been hospitalized,
without revealing why or what treatment he received, did not violate privilege);
Barry v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 568, 569-70, 254 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308-09 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1964) (information obtained by physician's observation may be disclosed, but his
conclusions may not).
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in medical records: (1) purpose for which the records are requested;
(2) laws governing the request and the parties; (3) the individual
who is the subject of the records; (4) the status of the party seeking
access; and (5) the degree of confidentiality which would remain if
the request is granted. Examination of these factors defines patterns
useful in predicting the results of record requests.
A. Purposes for Which Medical Records are Requested
There are a few uses of medical information which are so valuable
to society that the privacy interests involved diminish in relative
importance."' Public health, including epidemiologic and occupa-
tional health research1 4 and law enforcement purposes' fall within
this category. Other legitimate uses are found in civil actions and
criminal trials, 5 6 and insurance investigations.'57 Potentially unlawful
uses are for credit-rating, employment and defamation.'
1. Public Health Purposes
a. Research
While epidemiologic,5 9 occupational and other medical research
have vastly improved public health, '6° there remains some concern
for the privacy of those whose medical information is used in this
research.6 1 The records of large numbers of people must be studied
in order to discern trends in health and disease. Yet, if privacy
153. Legitimate purposes are discussed in this Note because these present the
difficult questions of whether to protect an individual's privacy interest or to
support an important public interest.
154. See supra notes 15 and 16; infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 199-221 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
158. These uses are illegitimate because they do not benefit society by either
their method of obtaining or their intended use of the medical records. Accordingly,
in these cases, a balancing of the public interest in disclosure with the privacy
interests of individuals is inappropriate. Rather, the issues involved are: (1) whether
the subject of the record is aware of the disclosure; (2) what remedy he can seek
under the various statutory, constitutional and common law protections available;
and (3) whether the issue may be best resolved by legislative action. See supra
notes 36-152 for a discussion of constitutional, common law and statutory pro-
tections.
159. See supra note 15.
160. See Kurland and Molgaard, The Patient Record in Epidemiology, 245 Sci.
AM. 54 (1981).
161. See Gordis & Gold, Privacy, Confidentiality and the Use of Medical Records
in Research, 207 Sci. 153 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gordis & Gold].
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protections are strictly enforced, this important public health research
could be impeded. 162 Patient consent requirements, such as those of
the Privacy Act, could effectively preclude access to the needed
records.
Under the open records statutes, which call for a balancing of
privacy interests against the public's need to know, 163 the conflict
is generally resolved in favor of the public need.164 Quite often,
health research studies do not need to follow up on the subsequent
health of individuals, so that names may be redacted from the
records before disclosure. 65 Deletion of identifying details satisfies
both interests involved and should be implemented whenever possible.
Indeed, because of the importance of research and the means avail-
able to protect privacy interests, legal battles over access to medical
records rarely arise in the context of public health research. When
conflicts do arise, it is often because the record custodian, for
example, an employer, does not wish to have the medical information
divulged. 66 The custodian usually cites "employee privacy interests"
as its reason for withholding the records.
Occupational health studies often require employee health records
maintained by employers. While subpoenas of these records by
NIOSH 67 are usually upheld against employer assertions of employee
162. Id. at 154.
163. See supra notes 102-20 and 133-35 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health, 690 F.2d
252, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (in view of Congressional purposes encouraging disclosure,
the balancing of public need for disclosure against privacy interests is "instructed
to 'tilt' . . . in favor of disclosure").
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1982) (deletion of identifying details permitted to
prevent unwarranted invasions of personal privacy).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580
(3d Cir. 1980).
167. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), es-
tablished by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), develops
occupational safety and health standards and conducts related research. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1982). The purpose of the Act is "to reduce the number and severity
of work-related injuries and illnesses which, despite current efforts of employers
and government, are resulting in ever-increasing human misery and economic loss."
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir. 1980)
(quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, S. REP. No. 1282, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177).
Among NIOSH's mandates are research, experiments and demonstrations to (1)
identify toxic substances; (2) develop criteria describing safe exposure levels; and
(3) explore problems created by new technology. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579.
In order to evaluate occupational health hazards, NIOSH is authorized to investigate
reasonable complaints made by authorized employee representatives or employers.
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6) (1982). Some investigations may entail issuing a subpoena
for employee medical records. 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1982). Investigations may also
1985] PRIVACY RIGHTS
privacy interests,161 privacy interests of individual employees may be
another matter. An individual employee might have particularly
include on-site inspections, medical interviews of employees, physical tests such as
blood and pulmonary examinations, and tests of physical surroundings and con-
ditions under which employees work. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579. For a further
discussion of OSHA and privacy rights of employees, see Note, OSHA Records
and Privacy: Competing Interests in the Workplace, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 953 (1978).
168. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580. The court recognized that employee
medical records come within the scope of constitutional privacy protections, but
that they are not absolutely protected. Id. at 577.
There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the
ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection . . . . It has been
recognized in various contexts that medical records and information stand
on a different plane than other relevant material.
Id. The court cites as examples of this recognition the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (comparing FED. R. Crv. P. 35 with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and medical
records exemption of FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982)) (special treatment of
medical files indicates "that information concerning one's body has a special
character" and is entitled to privacy protection).
The court held that medical records are protected by one of the zones of privacy.
638 F.2d at 577. However, it also said that employee privacy rights must be weighed
against the strong public interest represented by NIOSH investigations. Id. at 577-
78. The court listed a number of factors to be considered in this balancing test:
the kind of record involved, the information contained therein, the "potential for
harm" should disclosure occur, the effect of disclosure on the relationship (e.g.,
physician-patient) in which the record was made, whether safeguards were provided
against disclosure, and whether there were statutory or public interest reasons
directing disclosure. Id. at 578.
The court found that (1) disclosures in the interest of occupational safety and
health are as significant as other intrusions into records previously allowed; (2)
NIOSH had demonstrated sufficient need; (3) the material requested was not very
sensitive; and (4) NIOSH's procedures for securing the confidentiality of the in-
formation it was to receive were adequate. Thus, the interest in disclosure outweighed
the privacy interests of the employees in general. Id. at 580.
Other courts have enforced NIOSH subpoenas to obtain employee medical records.
See, e.g., Donovan v. Union Packing Co. of Omaha, 714 F.2d 838, 842 (8th Cir.
1983) (subpoena constitutionally permissible); General Motors Corp. v. Director of
Nat'l Inst., 636 F.2d 163, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981)
(parties' interests found not to be "mutually exclusive;" constitutional privacy
interest of employees not invaded because no public disclosure of their medical
information); United States v. Amalgamated Life Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 676, 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (NIOSH subpoena of insurer's records of deceased garment workers
enforced; public interest in determining potential carcinogenicity of formaldehyde
exposure outweighed privacy interest in records); United States v. Lasco Indus.,
531 F. Supp. 256, 265 (N.D. Texas 1981) (NIOSH had shown that societal interests
in records outweighed privacy interests); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
498 F. Supp. 1027, 1031 (E.D. Wisc. 1980) (employee health interests outweigh
employer interest in protecting employee privacy rights and no evidence exists that
NIOSH will improperly use the records; Wisconsin physician-patient privilege law
not applicable); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821,
824-26 (S.D. W. Va. 1977) (NIOSH may subpoena employee medical records for
study of cancer among duPont employees).
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sensitive material in his file. Courts have been unwilling to assume
that NIOSH's need for a file will always outweigh an employee's
privacy interest. 169 To resolve this tension, some courts require that
employees be notified that their records will be examined by NIOSH
unless they raise personal claims within a specified period. 70
Courts have recognized that in these cases NIOSH, rather than
the employer, acts in the true interests of the employees.1 7' Fur-
thermore, NIOSH procedures safeguard the confidentiality of the
records by prohibiting public disclosure. 72
Like NIOSH investigators, other health researchers should not be
hindered in obtaining access to medical records, considering the
important public interests they represent.7 3 When examining con-
fidentiality problems, legislators have emphasized the importance of
facilitating research by providing exemptions to privacy laws. 7 4
Much medical research does not require the study of records of
masses of individuals, but instead examines the individuals them-
selves. 175 Rather than use records already in existence, these studies
create new records. The issues involved in this type of research are
quite different from epidemiological issues. Confidentiality is a crit-
ical issue in this area.' 76 In order to satisfy individuals that their
169. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 581; United States v. Lasco Indus.,
531 F. Supp. at 265-66.
170. 638 F.2d at 581; see also 531 F. Supp. at 266.
171. United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. at 1031.
172. In addition to safeguards against disclosure, record systems for medical
research are not created without careful thought.
There are many careful controls on establishing systems of records. Under
the Privacy Act, for example, there must be public notice, formal no-
tification to OMB [Office of Management and Budget] and the Congress,
and a careful delineation of the purpose of the record system. These
requirements assure careful thought before embarking on the collection
of individually identifiable information. The review process for grant and
contract applications addresses the issues of the necessity of record sys-
tems. Other control devices, such as: agency regulations, OMB clearance
under the Federal Reports Act, and Institutional Review Boards for the
protection of human subjects, also serve as protections against casual or
unnecessary establishment of new data files by contractors and grantees.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDICAL RECORDS, supra note 3, at 25 (statement of C. Grant
Spaeth, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Legislation (Health)).
173. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
174. E.g., CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDICAL RECORDS, supra note 3, at 7-8 (additional
views of Paul G. Rogers); H.R. 5935, supra note 2, at 17-18; S.503 & S.865, supra
note 25, at 17-21.
175. For example, clinical studies may be conducted using patients at research
hospitals. Individuals may be closely monitored during their treatment, perhaps to
investigate new treatment procedures and medications.
176. Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 502 (N.D. 11. 1983).
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participation as subjects of a study will not compromise their privacy,
researchers assure them that the information will remain confidential.
In addition, researchers are required to take safety precautions against
invasions of privacy. 177
Despite promises of confidentiality, however, research information
may still be subject to judicial subpoena. 178 This potential for dis-
closure has been criticized for its chilling effect on research. 79 At
least one federal district court has held that a private party may
not subpoena medical records from a researcher where (1) the seeking
party's need for the evidence is "speculative and uncertain;"'' 0 (2)
disclosure would have a chilling effect on this and similar projects
even if names were deleted'"' since confidentiality is necessary to
prevent the "drying up of sources; ' 112 and (3) disclosure would force
the researcher into a breach of confidentiality. 8 3 In light of the
prevailing support for public health research, it is likely that more
courts, when considering whether to order disclosure, will attempt
to balance the need for the records with the effect on future research.
b. Reporting Laws
Access to medical information may also be required for non-
research public health purposes. For example, many state health
departments require reporting of medical information about venereal
disease, child abuse, injuries caused by deadly weapons, fetal deaths,' 4
abortions,8 5 and prescriptions given for dangerous drugs.
86
c. Consumer Health Organizations
Private parties may also seek medical records for public health
purposes. For example, consumer health organizations, pursuant to
federal or state FOIA's, may research government-funded medical
177. See Note, OSHA Records and Privacy: Competing Interests in the Workplace,
27 AM. U. L. REV. 953, 962-63 (1978). For a discussion of researcher confidentiality,
see Note Protection From Discovery of Researchers' Confidential Information:
Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal.
1976), 9 CONN. L. REV. 326 (1977).
178. Gordis & Gold, supra note 161.
179. Andrews, 97 F.R.D. at 500.
180. Id. at 502.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 499.
183. Id. at 500.
184. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 602 n.29.
185. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52, 79-81.
186. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
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providers and publish their findings in order to advance consumer
knowledge of available medical care. 87 The court or agency will
conduct a balancing test of public interest in disclosure versus privacy
interests as required by the FOIA. 88 Disclosure is likely where a
strong public interest is shown and individually identifiable details
are not needed, 89 since the underlying purpose of FOIA's is to
promote disclosure. 90
2. Law Enforcement Purposes
Medical records are often subpoenaed for use in administrative 9'
and grand jury investigations.' 92 Once again, where the disclosure
187. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of HEW,
477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 537, 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). In this case, a non-profit consumer health organization requested
documents from the Department of HEW disclosing and evaluating federally funded
medical services. The action was brought pursuant to the FOIA, and the medical
records exemption applied. The court said that "[p]rotecting the intimate details
of an individual's medical file is indeed a central goal of the privacy exemption."
477 F. Supp. at 603. The court weighed the competing interests of personal privacy
and public interests represented by Public Citizen and asked two questions: (1)
"will disclosure result in an invasion of privacy, and, if so, how seriously?" and
(2) "what public interest factors favor, or oppose, disclosure and what weight
should they be accorded?" Id.
Public Citizen maintained that disclosure would: (1) promote fully informed
medical decisions among the consuming public regarding physicians and hospitals
providing Medicare and Medicaid services; and (2) help physicians, state agencies
and academics in various ways. Id. at 604. The court concluded that, rather than
reflecting purely private interests, each of these groups had an interest in "scrutinizing
government performance" which is the primary purpose of the FOIA. Id. Fur-
thermore, Public Citizen insisted that it did not need or want individually identifying
factors. Id. at 599. The balance tipped in favor of disclosure; the court held the
privacy invasion was not " 'clearly unwarranted' in light of the important public
interests at stake." Id. at 605.
188. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 187.
190. See supra note 102.
191. See, e.g., Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978). In this case
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered patients' privacy rights in
medical records subpoenaed by the executive secretary of the New York State Board
for Professional Medical Conduct for purposes of investigating possible misconduct
in the use of Laetrile for treatment. The court based its holding on Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), and found the patients' constitutional rights were not
infringed upon because: (1) the subpoenaed information was "crucial to the im-
plementation of sound state policy;" and (2) confidentiality was guaranteed by the
statute. 581 F.2d at 37. The state policy supported was to investigate "licensed
physicians for medical misconduct" pursuant to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230
(McKinney Supp. 1977). The statute avoided public disclosure of patients' names
by the use of codes in place of names. 581 F.2d at 37.
192. See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
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is necessary for important public purposes, including investigations
of possible medical misconduct, 93 non-payment of taxes,1 94 employee
health and safety,' 95 or Medicaid fraud,1 96 the request is likely to
be granted.1 97 Moreover, information obtained during these inves-
426 (1983). In this case, a grand jury had subpoenaed patient medical records from
two doctors for an investigation of fraud in billings submitted to Michigan Blue
Cross-Blue Shield. The court found that while a federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege existed, it did not protect the patients' identities or the fact that they were
treated. Id. at 640. However, even if this information had been privileged, the
patients waived this privilege because they had previously disclosed their identities
to the insurers. Id. Furthermore, the court found these patients' constitutional
interests existed only to a limited extent; the court noted that individuals "possess
no reasonable expectation that [their] medical history will remain completely con-
fidential." Id. at 641.
Because the grand jury already knew the identity of these patients, their privacy
interest was diminished. Additionally, the nature of the grand jury investigation
protects the information with its "veil of secrecy." Id. at 642. Overall, the grand
jury's need to investigate violations of the law outweighs the "slight intrusions"
into patients' privacy interests. Id. The court's reasoning followed that of Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), and General Motors Corp. v. Director of the Nat'l
Inst., 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).
193. See supra note 191.
194. See United States v. Providence Hospital, 507 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich.
1981). An Internal Revenue Service summons of hospital information regarding
operations performed by the surgeon under investigation for non-payment of taxes
was enforced. The court dismissed the argument that disclosure was prohibited by
the Michigan physician-patient privilege statute. Id. at 520.
195. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The court found that employers violated sections of the National
Labor Relations Act by refusing to provide unions with health and safety information
pertaining to employees. The employers contended that the employees' constitutional
right to privacy and confidentiality in their medical records precluded disclosure.
The court rejected these assertions, stating that deletion of identifiable information
would have both protected these interests and conformed to the NLRB's orders.
Id. at 363.
196. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d 525, 531 (1982) (Medicaid
fraud investigations require disclosure of patients' records, otherwise a state may
not continue to receive federal funds).
197. See supra notes 193-96 and the cases cited therein. However, a recent case
forbade disclosure in the face of alleged public interests in part because the purposes
of the statute at issue did not support disclosure of the records in question. United
States v. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984). This case involved a Justice Department subpoena for medical
records of a seriously handicapped newborn whose parents had decided to forego
certain operations that would have prolonged her life. The Department purportedly
sought the records to determine whether she was being discriminated against because
of her handicap. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "under
these circumstances it is [C]ongress, rather than an executive agency, that must
weigh the competing interests at stake . . . . Until [C]ongress has spoken, it would
be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to approve the type of investigation
that has precipitated this lawsuit." 729 F.2d at 161. See supra note 74 for a
discussion of this case and tort law implications.
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tigations remains unavailable to the public, so the privacy invasion
is minimal. 198
3. Medical Records Requests in Civil Actions and Criminal Trials
Medical records may be sought through discovery procedures in
civil actions. 99 These records are often necessary in actions involving
personal injury,2°° insurance policy disputes,20' malpractice, 0 2 di-
198. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
426. Public disclosures are prevented either by the deletion of identifiable details
by administrative investigations or by the closed nature of investigations by grand
juries, professional review committees or government branches such as the I.R.S.
Id.; see also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d
348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (NLRB orders to delete "any information that could
reasonably be used to identify specific employees" would sufficiently protect em-
ployees' privacy rights).
199. Statutes and rules governing discovery will apply. See, e.g., N.Y.Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 3121 (McKinney 1970). Of course, if the action is brought in federal court,
federal law governing discovery and evidence will apply. Discovery in federal courts
is governed by FED. R. Crv. P. 26. Federal Rules 35 (physical and mental examination
of persons) and 16 (pretrial procedure) should be taken into consideration as well.
See, e.g., Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1965) (use of Rule 16
to direct exchange of medical reports in pretrial discovery). For examples of how
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are utilized in medical cases, see Benning v.
Phelps, 249 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1957) (whether to grant motion for production
of medical records is within the trial court's discretion upon consideration of
defendant's allegation of "good cause"); Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C.
1977); Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Md. 1961) (for motion for discovery
of medical records to succeed, where no absolute physician-patient privilege is
involved, good cause must be shown); Gillig v. Bymart-Tintair, Inc., 16 F.R.D.
393, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (in personal injury action, plaintiff may have discovery
of copy of her physical examination conducted by physician for defendant's insurer).
200. See, e.g., Luciano v. Moore, 45 Misc. 2d 335, 337, 256 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965). In this personal injury action arising out of an
auto accident, defendants sought discovery of plaintiff's hospital records. Although
plaintiff claimed the hospitalization had nothing to do with the injuries at issue,
the court held that defendants were entitled to obtain the records because the
statutory physician-patient privilege should not be interpreted so as to allow plaintiff
"to block pre-trial examination." Id. The court noted that defendants would only
be able to use the records at trial if they were found to be material. Id.
201. See, e.g., Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 252 A.D. 646, 300
N.Y.S. 721 (Ist Dep't 1937). In this action on an insurance policy defendant sought
deceased's hospital records in an attempt to set up the defense that deceased had
misrepresented the state of his health on his insurance application. Production was
not ordered because the records consisted of statutorily privileged communications.
Id. at 648, 300 N.Y.S. at 724.
202. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763, 267 S.E.2d 230 (1980). In this
malpractice suit for the wrongful death of plaintiff's husband, plaintiff sought to
discover records of a hospital medical review committee which had conducted an
unfavorable investigation of the defendant doctor's treatment of deceased. Pro-
duction was not ordered since the records were protected by a statutory privilege.
245 Ga. at 766, 267 S.E.2d at 232.
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vorce,2 °3 and contested wills.204 The records are useful in determining
and proving damages, showing pain and suffering, negotiating set-
tlements, and proving causation, negligence and competency.2 5
Discovery requests for medical files may be opposed by statutes
which make the information privileged. These include the physician-
patient privilege20 6 and state laws protecting the confidentiality of
state-conducted health emergency studies. 207 Unless a waiver is found 28
or the statute provides an exemption,209 the information given con-
fidentially will remain undiscoverable . 210
While the medical records are considered the property of the
doctor or hospital, the patient's attorney and opposing attorneys
may inspect and copy them with the patient's authorization. 21 How-
203. See, e.g., Zilboorg v. Zilboorg, 131 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1954). In this action on a divorce decree, the court held that, where names of
patients would not be publicly disclosed, husband (psychiatrist) may not assert the
statutory privilege to withhold information from his wife's discovery request. Id.
at 123.
204. See, e.g., In re Ericson's Will, 200 Misc. 1005, 106 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sur.
Ct. Suffolk County 1951). This case concerned a contested will. Discovery was
sought of deceased's hospital records by next of kin who were excluded from the
will which superseded a previous will. The majority of the estate was left to a
friend who was at deceased's bedside at execution of the will. The family was in
Sweden at the time the second will was executed. Discovery was granted. 200 Misc.
at 1008, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
205. 15 AM. JUR. TRIALS, Discovery and Evaluation of Medical Records § 2
(1968).
206. See, e.g., Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 252 A.D. 646, 300
N.Y.S. 721 (1st Dep't 1937); supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
207. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 206(l)j) (McKinney 1971).
208. See, e.g., Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 894 (N.D. 1974) (in
malpractice action, plaintiff waived physician-patient privilege by putting her physical
condition in issue); see also In re Ericson's Will, 200 Misc. 1005, 1008, 106 N.Y.S.
203, 204 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1951) (privilege may be waived by personal
representative of deceased, or in will contest by parties in interest). Contra Luciano
v. Moore, 45 Misc. 2d 335, 336, 256 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1965) (physician-patient privilege is "not waived by the institution of an action to
recover damages for personal injuries until the claimant offered testimony with
respect to his personal injury upon the trial of his case").
209. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Durand, 47 Wisc. 2d 527, 534, 177 N.W.2d 892, 896
(1970) (discovery statute required that defendant be allowed inspection of plaintiff's
medical records for good cause shown).
210. Rudnick v. Superior Court of Kern County, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 929, 523 P.2d
643, 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) ("there can be no discovery
of matter which is privileged"); In re Love Canal, 112 Misc. 2d 861, 863, 449
N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1982), aff'd, 92 A.D.2d 416, 460
N.Y.S.2d 850 (4th Dep't 1983) (" 'any communication which is privileged when
made remains privileged forever unless the privilege is waived by the client' ")
(quoting Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 283-84, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518, 525 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1975)).
211. Telephone interview with Medical Records Departments at New York Hos-
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ever, parties may be forced to resort to discovery, subpoena or
motions to have the records produced if the patient is reluctant to
authorize disclosure."'
Once obtained, admission of the records into evidence requires a
consideration of the hearsay rule unless the declarant, the record-
keeper is available to testify.213 Medical records made in the regular
course of business of a physician or hospital are generally admissible
as an exception to the hearsay exclusion rule.114
pital and New York University Medical Center, New York City, August 20, 1984.
Insurance companies may also have access to patient records. They must provide
a recent written authorization (usually within the last year) from the patient along
with the company's request for specific information. The medical records custodian
then will provide either a summary of the pertinent part of the file or a copy of
some extract of it. Id. The patient may not inspect his own medical records
maintained by private entities unless he reviews them with his physician. Id. There
are guidelines available for changing or correcting inaccuracies in the file. These
are provided by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation and are followed
nationwide by private hospitals. Id. However, plaintiffs may know the contents of
their own medical reports which defendants have obtained. Monier v. Chamberlain,
66 Ill. App. 2d 472, 483, 213 N.E.2d 425, 432 (111. App. Ct.), aff'd, 35 111. 2d
351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
212. 15 AM. JUR. TRIALS Discovery and Evaluation of Medical Records § 9
(1968); accord telephone interview with Legal Unit of Medical Records Department,
New York University Medical Center, New York City (August 20, 1984).
213. York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d 109, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (records of
clinical laboratory admissible in evidence, where pathologist creating the records
had died); see FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted"). FED. R. EvID. 802 states that "[hlearsay
is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
214. See, e.g., Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 191 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4), (6). The federal
act is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). Many states have adopted the business
records exception. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 4518 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1983). The purpose of the business records exception is to admit into evidence
records which are kept regularly in the course of that business and to avoid the
expense, inconvenience and perhaps the impossibility of calling as witnesses all the
people who had a part in creating the record. York v. Daniels, 259 S.W.2d at
124.
To be admitted under the business records exception, the medical records must:
(1) have been kept in the usual course of the doctor's or hospital's business; (2)
consist of factual statements rather than opinion; (3) be relevant and material; and
(4) be properly identified. See Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 F.2d
660, 667 (3d Cir. 1947); Kitchen v. Wilson, 335 S.W.2d 38, 43 (Mo. 1960); People
v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117, 121-22, 366 N.E.2d 69, 70-71, 397 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370-
71 (1977); Brady v. Comprehensive Omnibus Corp., 5 N.Y.S.2d 781, 78.1-82 (1st
Dep't 1938); Glenn v. Brown, 28 Wash. App. 86, 90, 622 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1980).
If the medical record consists of a physician's writing, it must be authenticated
that either the physician or someone under his direction wrote it, that it was made
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In criminal cases, medical records may be offered in evidence at
trial by either the defendant or the prosecution,2 15 used in pre-
sentencing considerations, '1 6 or used to impeach a witness's credi-
bility.217 If the material satisfies the requirements of the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, it will be admitted into evi-
dence." 8 Conflicts between the right to impeach a witness with his
medical records and privacy interests of the witness are resolved in
favor of admission; the right to confrontation has been held to be
more important than the right of privacy.2' 9 Victims' medical records
are admissible if relevant to an element of the crime.220 The de-
fendant's own records may be admitted if it is important to consider
the state of his health or mind at the time of the alleged crime, or
at the time of trial, if his competency to stand trial is at issue.221
near the time of treatment, and that such records are usually made in the regular
course of business. See Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 182 F.2d 793, 797
(3d Cir. 1950).
Parts of a medical record may be admissible under the business records exception
while other parts are not. Only those portions relevant to the symptoms, treatment,
fact of hospitalization or medical or surgical history of the patient's particular
illness or injury may be admitted. Temple v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 167 Conn.
631, 633, 356 A.2d 880, 882 (1975). However, the diagnosis or other opinion is
inadmissible because it is more in the nature of expert opinion. Commonwealth
v. Seville, 266 Pa. Super. 587, 591, 405 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 1979).
215. See, e.g., People v. Gorgol, 122 Cal. App. 2d 281, 294, 265 P.2d 69, 81
(Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (hospital records admissible, against defendant's objection,
as evidence tending to disprove defendant's defense of mental incapacity); State v.
Paulette, 158 Conn. 22, 25, 255 A.2d 855, 856 (1969) (medical test of rape victim
admitted because it was in regular course of hospital business to make and record
medical tests); State v. O'Toole, 520 S.W.2d 177, 181-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(hospital records describing victim's injuries required to prove element of crime
charged: first degree robbery is violent taking of property from another).
216. See, e.g., Farrell v. State, 213 Md. 348, 355, 131 A.2d 863, 867 (1957) (after
verdict is in, trial court is not limited by rules of evidence in what it may consider
when sentencing).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983)
(in appeal from mail-fraud conviction, medical records of witness may be used to
attack his credibility because "in the context of [a] criminal trial, [privacy rights
of patients] must 'yield to the paramount right of the defense to cross-examine
effectively the witness' ") (quoting United States v. Society of Indep. Gasoline
Marketers of Am., 624 F.2d 461, 469 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub. nor. Kayo
Oil Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 1078 (1980); Banks v. Wittenberg, 82 Mich.
App. 274, 266 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
218. See, e.g., State v. Paulette, 158 Conn. 22, 23, 255 A.2d 855, 856 (1969).
219. See supra note 183; United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 763-64 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d
272, 276 (5th Cir. 1981).
220. See State v. Paulette, 158 Conn. 22, 255 A.2d 855 (1969).
221. See People v. Gorgol, 122 Cal. App. 2d 281, 265 P.2d 69 (1953).
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4. Medical Records Requests for Third-Party Payment Purposes
Third-party payers such as insurance companies, government and
employers, have a legitimate need for some health information about
their insureds or applicants for policies. However, litigation often
arises when insurance companies attempt to avoid paying claims,
alleging that the claimant misrepresented the state of his health on
his application. z22  Also, methods used by insurance companies to
obtain and share medical information may be questionable, as where
insurance companies exchange, buy and even steal records.22 3 Fur-
thermore, privacy concerns are valid where whole medical files are
disclosed to insurers, rather than just the minimum information
necessary. 2 24
B. Likelihood of Disclosure
The variety of laws involved further complicates the outcome of
medical records requests. If the records are held by a government
agency, access must be obtained pursuant to a FOIA.22 1 If the records
are in the possession of a private entity such as a physician, private
hospital or clinic, these statutes have no relevance, and the request
will be governed by rules of discovery and evidence. 226 The requests
are also affected by constitutionality issues 227 and by statutes con-
cerning the physician-patient privilege, '21 privacy 229 and confiden-
tiality210 which may be invoked to prevent disclosure.
222. See Croll v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 562, 565 (3d Cir.
1952); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 F.2d 660, 667 (3d Cir. 1947);
-Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Sandoval, 47 Ariz. 167, 173-74, 54 P.2d 557, 558
(1936); New Empire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 235 Ark. 758, 764, 362 S.W.2d 4, 5
(1962); Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 252 A.D. 646, 647-48, 300 N.Y.S.
721 (1st Dep't 1937); Freedom v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 342 Pa. 404, 408-
09, 21 A.2d 81, 83 (1941).
223. See supra note 17.
1 224. See Winslade, supra note 17, at 509.
225. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
FOIA. See supra note 133 for a list of state open-records statutes.
226. See supra notes 199-221 and accompanying text for discussion of discovery
and evidentiary rules as applied to requests for medical records.
227. See supra notes 36-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of consti-
tutional issues relevant to requests for medical records.
228. See supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
physician-patient privilege and its applicability to requests for medical records.
229. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal
Privacy Act of 1974 and its protection against disclosure of medical information.
See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of state privacy
protection statutes.
230. Confidentiality laws include the physician-patient privilege, discussed supra
PRIVACY RIGHTS
Another factor to be considered is whose records are being sought.
If the records concern a group under study by public health re-
searchers, disclosure is likely to be enforced by the courts."' Similarly,
if the requested medical information pertains to a party in a civil
action, and if it is relevant to issues in the case, disclosure is also
likely.232 If the records pertain to non-parties, however, the physician-
patient privilege clearly forbids disclosure. 233 Where the party whose
records are sought is under investigation on criminal charges, the
strong public interest in an effective criminal justice system and the
defendant's right to confrontation will generally outweigh any privacy
interests .234
Accessibility of medical records also depends upon who is seeking
them. NIOSH, 235 grand juries, 23 6 and investigations conducted by
government bodies such as the I.R.S.,237 state health departments,238
and the National Labor Relations Board 23 9 are favored in conflicts
over disclosure. When the party seeking access is a private entity
or individual who wishes to use another's records for private benefit,
for example in civil litigation, the balance of competing interests
tends to favor privacy. As a result, disclosure is not likely without
some supervening factor such as waiver of confidentiality. 240
Lastly, courts may consider the degree of confidentiality which
would remain after disclosure. Medical records requests which do
not require identifiable details or which use codes instead of names
are the least intrusive.24I However, some parties, such as NIOSH,
notes 138-52 and accompanying text, and laws which make particular types of
records confidential. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-357, 82-349 (1976) (hospital
records); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1493 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983) (sexual
assault records); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 9116 (1983) (records of Health Maintenance
Organizations). See supra note 136 for other relevant state statutes protecting privacy
and allowing disclosure of medical records only in specific situations.
231. See supra notes 159-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of occu-
pational and public health requests for medical records.
232. See supra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 192.
237. See supra note 194.
238. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 195.
240. The issues will involve the constitutional right of privacy and confidentiality
of the information such as the physician-patient privilege or other statutory pro-
tections. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text for constitutionality dis-
cussion. See supra note 230 for confidentiality laws.
241. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep't of HEW, 477 F.
Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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public health researchers and grand juries often need these identi-
fiers. 24 2 Their requests are usually granted, nevertheless, because of
the important public interests they represent, and because they pro-
vide safeguards against public disclosure of the sensitive informa-
tion. 243 Where little or no confidentiality would remain, requests are
less likely to be granted because, even where the request represents
an important public interest, medical confidentiality remains a sig-
nificant factor. 2"
Conclusion
Individuals have privacy rights in their medical records, but society,
too, has interests in those records. An individual may have legal
recourse against invasions of this privacy interest, depending upon
who is the party seeking or having obtained access to the records,
the purposes for which the record is sought, and whether there are
common law, statutory or constitutional protections available. On
the other hand, an individual's interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of medical information is often sacrificed in the interest
of legitimate public needs such as public health, or private needs
such as defending a criminal charge.
With the ever-increasing storage and easy retrieval of computerized
information, invasions of informational privacy are likely to increase.
Presently existing legal protections are proving inadequate. To keep
apace with these developments until legislatures act, courts must
balance the competing interests involved and strive to satisfy all of
the important interests by flexible methods such as deletion of
identifiable information and limiting disclosure to the information
requested.
Carole M. Cleaver
242. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 575 (3d Cir.
1980).
243. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 168.
244. See, e.g., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir. 1980).
